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I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of individuals to deduct interest for Federal income tax
purposes has been sharply limited since the passage of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986. One category of interest that remains deductible
under present law consists of "qualified residence interest." Very gen-
erally, this category includes interest on indebtedness that is secured
by a qualified residence of the taxpayer. It may be thought of generi-
cally as interest on home mortgage indebtedness. Qualified residence
interest has been of heightened significance for many individual tax-
payers since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 because it is
virtually the only type of interest that is deductible even though unre-
lated to a trade, business or investment activity.
In obtaining a loan, particularly a home mortgage loan, a borrower
may be required not only to pay a stated rate of interest over the term
of the loan, but also to pay one or more "points" at the time the loan
proceeds are advanced. Such points are usually expressed as a per-
centage of the loan amount (i.e., one "point" equals one percent of the
loan amount) and constitute a form of prepaid interest. Generally,
they are charged by a lender at the time of making a loan in exchange
for a lower stated rate of interest over the term of the loan. Because
they represent compensation for the use or forbearance of money,
points paid or incurred in obtaining a loan are generally considered
interest and, like the interest charged during the term of the loan it-
self, may be qualified residence interest.
Although points may constitute qualified residence interest, their
deductibility may be subject to limitations imposed by Internal Reve-
nue Code section 461(g), enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Sec-
tion 461(g) defers a cash method taxpayer's deduction for prepaid
interest to the period to which such payment is properly allocable.
Therefore, if an item constitutes qualified residence interest, but is
also prepaid interest, the otherwise allowable deduction may be de-
ferred. This deferral rule does not apply, however, to certain "points
paid in respect of any indebtedness incurred in connection with the
1096 [Vol. 71:1095
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purchase or improvement of, and secured by, the taxpayer's principal
residence."
Just as the category of qualified residence interest has assumed
heightened significance for individual taxpayers under post-1986 law,
so too has the question of how points paid in connection with a home
mortgage loan will be treated for Federal income tax purposes. The
latter question, which is the subject of this article, has become even
more critical because of the confluence of several recent events. First,
the relatively low interest rates recently prevailing have prompted an
increase in home mortgage financings and refinancings and, with that
phenomenon, an increase in the number of individual taxpayers who
have recently paid or will pay points in that context. Second, section
461(g) has been the subject of recent case law and administrative
developments that have added a degree of uncertainty and confusion
concerning the scope of that provision as it affects individual
taxpayers.
This Article seeks to illustrate and clarify the law in this area by
examining the limitations on the ability of individual taxpayers to de-
duct prepaid interest under section 461(g), with an emphasis on points
relating to the acquisition or improvement of a principal residence.
First, it outlines the relevant statutory provisions concerning the de-
duction for interest paid by individuals and the limitations imposed on
the deduction of prepaid interest under section 461(g). In particular, it
examines the circumstances surrounding Congress' enactment of sec-
tion 461(g). Second, this Article considers the relevant case law and
administrative pronouncements defining the scope of the provision,
especially section 461(g)(2), as it affects individuals. In this context, it
notes that Congress could alleviate some confusion in this area by
amending section 461(g)(2) to conform more closely with section
163(h), insofar as interest or points relate to indebtedness incurred to
acquire, construct, or substantially improve a principal residence. Fi-
nally, this Article analyzes the Internal Revenue Service's recently ar-
ticulated position in Revenue Procedure 92-12, which creates a safe
harbor for the deduction of points paid in connection with the acquisi-
tion of a principal residence. The Article concludes that the elements
defining this safe harbor are largely consistent with prior authorities,
yet contain several ambiguities that may undermine the predictability,
and hence usefulness, of the Internal Revenue Service's "safe harbor"
test. It argues that such ambiguities should be resolved in a manner
consistent with existing law. Moreover, it emphasizes that the safe
harbor itself is not exclusive, and identifies those situations in which
prepaid interest, not meeting the requirements of the safe harbor, re-
mains deductible.
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II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE
DEDUCTIBILITY OF QUALIFIED RESIDENCE
INTEREST AND PREPAID INTEREST
A. Section 163(h)
Present law sharply limits the ability of individuals to deduct "per-
sonal interest" for Federal income tax purposes. In contrast with pre-
1986 law, which permitted a deduction for interest on indebtedness
generally, including that incurred to finance wholly personal expendi-
tures, current law treats interest paid by individuals as non-deductible
personal interest unless it falls within any of five specifically enumer-
ated categories.' Of significance for many individual taxpayers, de-
ductible interest under post-1986 law includes "qualified residence
interest." 2 This category includes interest on certain "acquisition in-
debtedness," which is secured by a qualified residence of the taxpayer
and which is incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially im-
proving such a residence, or in refinancing certain indebtedness that
was so incurred.3 It also includes interest on certain '"home equity"
indebtedness, which is secured by a qualified residence of the tax-
payer, without regard to the purpose for which the loan is incurred.4
1. Individual taxpayers may not deduct "personal interest." I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(1)(1988). "Personal interest" means any interest other than: (A) trade
or business related interest; (B) investment interest; (C) interest allocable to any
passive activity; (D) qualified residence interest; and (E) certain interest paid in
connection with estate tax liabilities. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(1988). Except as other-
wise indicated, all section references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended and presently in effect.
2. "Qualified residence interest" means any interest paid or accrued on "acquisition
indebtedness" (as defined in I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(1988)) or "home equity indebt-
edness" (as defined in I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(1988)). In order to qualify under
either category, the indebtedness must be secured by a "qualified residence."
I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(II)(1988), (C)(i)(1988). The term "qualified residence" is
defined to mean the taxpayer's principal residence (within the meaning of I.R.C.
§ 1034(1988)) and one other residence of the taxpayer designated for this purpose
and used as a residence (within the meaning of I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1)(1988)). I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(5)(A)(1988).
3. "Acquisition indebtedness" means indebtedness used to acquire, construct or sub-
stantially improve a qualified residence and includes indebtedness used to refi-
nance indebtedness used for the foregoing purposes, up to the amount of the
refinanced indebtedness. The aggregate amount qualifying as acquisition indebt-
edness in any taxable period is limited to $1,000,000. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(1988).
4. "Home equity indebtedness" is indebtedness secured by a qualified residence and
not in excess of (i) the fair market value of the residence, reduced by (ii) the
amount of acquisition indebtedness with respect to such residence. The aggregate
amount qualifying as home equity indebtedness for any taxable period is limited
to $100,000. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(1988).
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I.R.C. SECTION 461(g)
B. Section 461(g)
1. In General
Although Congress has permitted individuals to deduct qualified
residence interest, it has done so against the backdrop of certain other
statutory provisions affecting interest. In particular, I.R.C. section
461(g), enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,5 places limits on the
deductibility of prepaid interest. As a general rule, section 461(g)(1)
defers a cash method taxpayer's deduction for prepaid interest to the
period to which such payment is properly allocable. Therefore, if an
item constitutes qualified residence interest, but is also prepaid inter-
est, the otherwise allowable deduction may be deferred under section
461(g)(1).
One of the most common forms of prepaid interest consists of
"points" charged by a lender at the time of making a loan. Such points
are usually charged in exchange for providing a lower stated rate of
interest over the term of the loan and represent compensation for the
use or forbearance of money. Significantly, however, from the per-
spective of individual taxpayers, section 461(g)(2) provides that the
deferral rule of section 461(g)(1) does not apply to certain "points paid
in respect of any indebtedness incurred in connection with the
purchase or improvement of, and secured by, the taxpayer's principal
residence."6
2. Enactment of LR.C. Section 461(g)
Prior to the enactment of section 461(g) as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, no specific statutory provision addressed the treatment of
prepaid interest by a cash method taxpayer. The area thus was gov-
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 208(a), 90 Stat. 1542 (1976); I.R.C.
§ 461(g)(1988) provides as follows:
(g) PREPAM INTEREST.-
(1) IN GENERAL-If the taxable income of the taxpayer is computed
under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, inter-
est paid by the taxpayer which, under regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary, is properly allocable to any period -
(A) with respect to which the interest represents a charge for the use
or forbearance of money, and
(B) which is after the close of the taxable year in which paid, shall be
charged to capital account and shall be treated as paid in the period to
which so allocable.
(2) EXCEPTION.-This subsection shall not apply to points paid in re-
spect of any indebtedness incurred in connection with the purchase or
improvement of, and secured by, the principal residence of the taxpayer
to the extent that, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such
payment of points is an established business practice in the area in which
such indebtedness is incurred, and the amount of such payment does not
exceed the amount generally charged in such area.
6. I.R.C. § 461(g)(2)(1988).
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erned by case law and administrative rulings. Until the late 1960s, tax-
payers were able to prepay as much as five years' interest with the
apparent approval of the courts and the Internal Revenue Service.7
In 1968, however, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that a cash
method taxpayer's deduction for an interest prepayment covering a
period ending more than twelve months beyond the close of the taxa-
ble year of payment would be deemed to create a material distortion of
income. The deduction would, therefore, have to be allocated over the
taxable years to which the payment related, rather than be allowed in
full in the year of payment.8 If the interest prepayment covered a pe-
riod ending less than twelve months beyond the close of the taxable
year, various factors would apply in determining whether the pay-
ment resulted in a material distortion of income. 9
In enacting the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress was concerned
with the phenomenon of "tax shelters," a preoccupation that only be-
came more acute by 1986.10 With specific reference to section 461(g),
the legislative history reflects Congress' concern that prepaid interest
was extensively used in many tax shelters "to defer tax on income
which would otherwise be taxable in higher marginal brackets" and
its belief that the "creation of a tax shelter with prepaid interest can-
not be justified even under the cash method of accounting."11
Several aspects of the enactment of section 461(g) are noteworthy.
For one, the provision sought to conform the tax treatment of interest
prepayments by cash method taxpayers with that required of accrual
method taxpayers.12 Moreover, Congress noted the "considerable un-
7. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess:, at 97 (1975); S. REP. NO. 938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1976).
8. Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76.
9. The ruling considered, for example: the amount of the taxpayer's income in the
year of payment and in previous years; the amount of the prepaid interest; the
time of payment; the reason for the prepayment; and the presence of a varying
rate of interest over the term of the loan. Id.
10. The House Report's description of the provisions of the bill addressed to tax shel-
ters spans over 100 pages. See generally H. R. REP. No. 658 at 8, 25-130; See also S.
REP. No. 938 at 3, 39-108. In response to the problems of "tax shelters," the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 also added the "at-risk rules" of I.R.C. § 465 (1988), precluded
use of the cash method of accounting for many farming activities, and amended
certain partnership provisions. Significantly, however, it did not enact provisions
imposing Limitations on Artificial Losses (LAL) proposed by the House version
of the bill. In 1986, Congress enacted, among other provisions, the passive activity
loss rules of I.R.C. § 469 (1988).
11. Congress indicated that the justifications underlying the use of the cash method,
namely, simplicity and avoidance of complex recordkeeping or computations,
were inapplicable to prepaid interest, which could be allocated over the term of a
loan. H.R. REP. No. 658 at 99; S. REP. No. 938 at 103.
12. H.R. REP. No. 658 at 100; S. REP. No. 938 at 104. The committee reports noted
that an accrual method taxpayer could deduct prepaid interest only in the period
in which the use of money occurs and only to the extent of the interest cost of
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certainty" inherent in the case-by-case approach of then-existing law
as to whether a particular payment resulted in a material distortion of
income.13 Congress did not intend to change the existing definition of
"interest;" in order to be deductible under section 461(g), an item
would have to constitute interest that was otherwise deductible.14
Similarly, it did not intend to change then-existing law with respect to
a cash method taxpayer who received a "discount loan" in which the
lender delivered to the borrower an amount less than the face amount
of the loan, with the difference representing a charge for the use of
the borrowed funds. Such a taxpayer could not deduct the entire in-
terest element inherent in the discount in the year in which the loan
proceeds were received, but rather could deduct the interest element
only when and as the face amount of the loan was repaid.' 5
3. The Section 461(g)(2) Exception
Notwithstanding the broad rule prohibiting an immediate deduc-
tion for prepaid interest under section 461(g)(1), Congress created an
exception in section 461(g)(2). Under this exception, points paid by a
cash method taxpayer on indebtedness incurred in connection with
the purchase or improvement of, and secured by, the taxpayer's princi-
pal residence are deductible in the year of actual payment. The com-
mittee reports indicate that points will not qualify under this
exception "if the loan proceeds were used for purposes other than
purchasing or improving the taxpayer's principal residence, or if loan
proceeds secured by other property were used to purchase or improve
a principal residence."' 6 The exception was to apply only to "points
on a home mortgage, and not to other charges."' 7 The Senate bill ad-
ded the further requirement, adopted in the House-Senate conference,
that in order to qualify under the section 461(g)(2) exception, the
charging of points must reflect an established business practice in the
geographical area where the loan is made, and the deduction allowed
cannot exceed the number of points generally charged in that area for
comparable transactions.s The House and Senate committee reports
using the borrowed funds during that period. The time of actual payment was
not material, nor was the existence of a fixed liability to make a prepayment of
interest sufficient to justify a deduction. Id. at n.6.
13. H.R. REP. No. 658 at 99; S. REP. No. 938 at 103.
14. The legislative history noted that a purported interest payment might not be true
interest and indicated that the Internal Revenue Service or taxpayers could still
assert, where appropriate, that a payment denominated "interest" was, in sub-
stance, an additional portion of the purchase price of property, a dividend, a pay-
ment for an option, etc. H.R. REP. No. 658 at 100, n.7; S. REP. No. 938 at 104, n.7.
15. H.R. REP. No. 658 at 101; S. REP. No. 938 at 105.
16. See supra note 15.
17. See supra note 15.
18. S. REP. No. 938 at 105; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 417 (1976).
1992] 1101
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
were in virtual accord on all issues, except for this "geographical con-
formity" requirement, which was not addressed in the House
Report. 19
While the legislative history is relatively explicit concerning Con-
gress' reasons for adding section 461(g)(1), it does not elaborate upon
its rationale for providing the exception of section 461(g)(2). Never-
theless, one can surmise that given its concern about the use of pre-
paid interest in "tax shelters," Congress perceived a lesser possibility
of abuse in the case of points relating to the purchase or improvement
of a taxpayer's principal residence. Furthermore, Congress may also
have sought to preserve and codify, at least in part, what it perceived
as the existing administrative practice concerning points paid in con-
nection with indebtedness incurred to purchase a personal residence.20
In any event, the emphasis in the legislative history on the technical
elements of the exception and the addition by the Senate of the "geo-
graphical conformity" requirement leave one with the overall impres-
sion that Congress intended section 461(g)(2) to be a fairly narrow
exception to the broad deferral rule of section 461(g)(1).
III. CASE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF
SECTION 461(g)
Since its enactment, section 461(g) has been the subject of case law
and administrative rulings. The following section of this article identi-
fies and discusses the problems presented and issues raised by such
authorities.
A. Identifying Prepayments that Qualify as Interest
As noted above, section 461(g) was not intended to change the defi-
19. The two bills also contained different transitional rules and effective dates. H.R.
RFP. No. 658 at 101; S. REP. No. 938 at 105. As enacted, § 461(g) generally applies
to prepayments of interest made on and after January 1, 1976, with an exception
for prepayments of interest made before January 1, 1977, pursuant to a binding
contract or written loan commitment in existence on September 16, 1975 (and at
all times thereafter), and which required prepayment of such amounts by the
taxpayer. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1542 (1976).
For a case construing the provisions of this transitional rule, see Wetterholm v.
Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 988 (1986), finding that the issuance of a conditional
commitment by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was
not a "written loan commitment" of the type required by the transitional rule,
and thus holding that a prepayment of interest made during 1976 was subject to
the provisions of § 461(g).
20. In Rev. Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 C.B. 29, a cash method taxpayer paid six "points," con-
stituting interest, from separate funds in connection with a mortgage loan for the
purchase of a principal residence. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that such
payment did not result in a material distortion of income and was therefore de-
ductible currently without the need for proration as might otherwise be required
by Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76, discussed supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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nition of "interest."21 Although the legislative history did not specifi-
cally elaborate on that definition, other than to identify certain
payments that would not be considered interest,22 prior authorities
had generally held that irrespective of the particular label used to de-
scribe it, "interest" for tax purposes represents a "compensation for
the use or forbearance of money."23 Consistent with this approach, it
has been held that a payment must be true interest to be both subject
to section 461(g)(1) and eligible for the exception thereto under sec-
tion 461(g)(2). 24 In Beek v. Commissioner,25 the Tax Court held that
all interest deductible under section 163 is subject to the allocation
provisions of section 461(g). In doing so, it rejected the taxpayer's pro-
posed definition of interest which was based upon state-usury law con-
cepts and under which a so-called "time-price differential" paid in
connection with the acquisition of property was not "interest" within
the purview of section 461(g)(1). 26
21. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 14 (observing that the legislative history indicates that in appro-
priate cases, a payment denominated as "interest" might be recharacterized as a
payment of an additional portion of the purchase price for property, a dividend,
or a payment for an option).
23. See, e.g., Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
24. For situations arising prior to the effective date of § 461(g), see, for example, Rev.
Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 C.B. 29 (payment of six "points" ($1200) from separate funds
in connection with a $20,000 mortgage loan used to purchase a $25,000 principal
residence was interest because paid as compensation to the lender solely for the
use or forbearance of money; held: payment was deductible and did not result in a
material distortion of income); Cathcart v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321
(1977)(points charged in connection with a loan incurred during 1973 concededly
represented an interest charge, and not a charge for services rendered, but a de-
duction was denied because points were incurred in connection with a net pro-
ceeds loan, and therefore not "paid" during the year of the loan). For a case
arising after the effective date of § 461(g), see Fox v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH)
383, aff'd without published opinion, 943 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1991)(item denomi-
nated points may have been a nondeductible charge for services rendered, rather
than a true interest charge, but even if the item were true interest, it was not
"paid" by the taxpayers, who received a net proceeds loan from the lender).
25. 80 T.C. 1024 (1983).
26. The taxpayers in Beeck argued that since § 461(g) uses both the term "interest"
and the phrase "a charge for the use or forbearance of money," some interest
prepayments did not represent a charge for the use or forbearance of money and
could therefore be deducted without regard to the limitations of that section. Re-
lying upon the legislative history described supra note 14 and accompanying text,
the Tax Court rejected that argument and properly concluded that all interest on
indebtedness described in § 163 was subject to the allocation rules of § 461(g). It
found that Congress had not intended to change the definition of "interest" for
tax purposes, and had known that collusive buyers and sellers might designate as
interest in their contracts certain payments, such as payments of additional
purchase price, that were not true interest. To distinguish between such pay-
ments, it used the term "interest" to describe the former and the phrase "a
charge for the use or forbearance of money" for the latter. The Tax Court thus
concluded that Congress intended to ensure that, irrespective of the labels affixed
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B. The Concept of "Payment" and the Problems of Net Proceeds Loans
As indicated earlier, Congress did not intend by the enactment of
section 461(g) to change the treatment of a cash method taxpayer who
received a "discount loan" (i.e., one in which the lender delivered an
amount smaller than the face amount of the loan, with the difference
representing a charge for the use of the borrowed funds). Such a tax-
payer could not deduct the entire interest element inherent in the dis-
count in the year in which the loan proceeds were received, but rather
could deduct it only when and as the face amount of the loan was
repaid.2 7
Accordingly, no deduction is permitted under section 461(g)(2)
where the points are withheld by the lender as part of a net-proceeds
loan made to a cash method taxpayer. In Schubel v. Commissioner,28
the earliest case to so decide, the Tax Court cited two bases for its
conclusion. First, it found that when Congress used the term "paid" in
section 461(g)(2), it was aware of the existing case law in the specific
area of prepaid interest and the narrow interpretation of the term
"paid" in general. Second, it concluded that section 461(g)(2) only lifts
the bar to the deduction for prepaid interest created by section
461(g)(1); even if that limitation is inapplicable, it still must be demon-
strated that a deduction is proper under the taxpayer's method of ac-
counting. In this connection, the incurring of points through a net-
proceeds loan was likened to the furnishing of the taxpayer's own
promissory note, an act that would not constitute payment by a cash
method taxpayer.29 Other decided cases have reached this result.3 o
Furthermore, in those situations in which it has ruled that a deduction
was allowable under section 461(g)(2), the Internal Revenue Service
has emphasized that the points were paid from separate funds that
were brought to the loan closing.31
by the taxpayers, only prepayments that were truly interest for tax purposes
were subject to the allocation rules of § 461(g). Beek v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 1024,
1032-33 (1983).
27. H.R. REP. No. 658 at 98, 101; S. REP. No. 938 at 105.
28. 77 T.C. 701 (1981).
29. Id. at 706-707. The court relied upon Rubnitz v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 621 (1977), in-
volving a taxable year prior to the enactment of § 461(g), which held that a cash
method partnership did not "pay" points in connection with a loan where the
lender withheld such points from the loan proceeds advanced. For another case
applying this rule under the law in effect prior to the enactment of § 461(g), see
Cathcart v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321 (1977)(deduction denied where points
constituted "true interest", but were withheld by the lender from the loan
proceeds).
30. See, e.g., Fox v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 383 (1989), aff'd without published
opinion, 943 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1991).
31. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146. In Situation 2 described in the ruling,
part of the loan proceeds were used for the improvement of the taxpayer's princi-
pal residence, and points allocable thereto were held to be deductible under
1104 [Vol. 71:1095
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C. Qualifying Uses of Loan Proceeds: Purchase or Improvement of a
Principal Residence
1. In General
By requiring that the points be "paid in respect of indebtedness
incurred in connection with the purchase or improvement of a princi-
pal residence," the statutory language makes clear that the purpose
for which the loan proceeds are used is a material element in deter-
mining whether the section 461(g)(2) exception is available. The legis-
lative history indicates that points will not qualify under the exception
"if the loan proceeds are used for purposes other than purchasing or
improving the taxpayer's principal residence, or if loan proceeds se-
cured by property other than his principal residence are used to
purchase or improve his residence." 32 In all cases, the statute specifies
that the indebtedness must be secured by the taxpayer's principal resi-
dence in order for section 461(g)(2) to apply.
2. Loan Proceeds Used in Connection with the "Purchase" of a
Principal Residence and the Related Problems of
Refinancing
Where the loan proceeds for which points are paid are used by the
taxpayer to purchase a principal residence (i.e., are obtained and paid
over to or for the benefit of the seller of the residence) the use of
proceeds requirement imposed by section 461(g)(2) is satisfied. Diffi-
culties arise, however, where the loan proceeds are used to refinance a
prior loan that was itself used to effect such a purchase.
In its administrative pronouncements, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice had indicated that loan proceeds used to refinance an existing in-
debtedness ordinarily would not satisfy the requirements of section
461(g)(2).33 Moreover, the use of loan proceeds to refinance preexist-
ing purchase money indebtedness, rather than to initially purchase a
principal residence, had been noted by courts in several cases as a pos-
sible ground for finding section 461(g)(2) inapplicable, although no
court had expressly used that fact as a basis for its decision.34 It was
§ 461(g)(2). The Internal Revenue Service emphasized that the points in question
were "paid from separate funds of [the taxpayer] that were brought to the loan
closing. If the points had not been paid from separate funds of [the taxpayer] that
had been brought to the loan closing, the points would not have been paid at the
time of the dosing, and it would be irrelevant whether the indebtedness was in-
curred in connection with the purchase or improvement of [the taxpayer's] prin-
cipal residence." Id at 147.
32. See supra text accompanying note 16.
33. See Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146.
34. In Schubel v. Comm'r, discussed supra text accompanying notes 28-29, a deduc-
tion was denied because points were not "paid" by taxpayers where they were
withheld by the lender as part of a net proceeds loan. The court did not address
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not until the case of Huntsman v. Commissioner 35 that a court di-
rectly addressed the deductibility of points paid in connection with the
refinancing of indebtedness that itself was used to purchase a princi-
pal residence.
In Huntsman, the taxpayers had obtained a $122,000 loan in Janu-
ary 1981. They used the proceeds to purchase their principal resi-
dence. This loan was a three-year mortgage financing with a balloon
payment due at maturity. In July 1982, they obtained a $22,000 home
improvement loan, secured by a second mortgage on their home. Fi-
nally, in September 1983, they obtained a $148,000 thirty-year variable
rate mortgage secured by their home. They paid three points and used
the proceeds to repay the outstanding balance of the prior loans. For
their 1983 taxable year, they deducted the three points paid in connec-
tion with the last of these loans.
The Commissioner denied the deduction, asserting that section
461(g)(2) did not apply to points paid for refinancing a home mortgage,
but rather only to points paid in financing the initial purchase. The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination by a vote of 8-3.
The majority of the Tax Court inferred from the legislative history
that section 462(g)(2) was limited to points paid in connection with
financing the actual purchase of a principal residence or financing im-
provements to such residence. The majority found it significant that,
as part of the Revenue Act of 1987, Congress had amended section
163(h) to specifically address the deductibility of interest generally on
certain refinancing loans, but had left section 461(g) unchanged.36 Re-
the Internal Revenue Service's alternative argument that because the loan pro-
ceeds were used to pay existing indebtedness, they were not used for "the
purchase or improvement of... the principal residence of the taxpayer." See also
Fox v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 383 (1989), aff'd without published opinion, 943
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1991)(court observed that points may not be deductible to the
extent that loan proceeds are used for refinancing, but sustained disallowance of
deduction on grounds that points were not "paid" where retained by lender in a
net proceeds loan transaction).
35. 91 T.C. 917 (1988), rev'd, 905 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1990).
36. Deductible "qualified residence interest" includes interest paid during the taxa-
ble year on "acquisition indebtedness with regard to any qualified residence of
the taxpayer." I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(i)(1988). Acquisition indebtedness means
any indebtedness which (1) is incurred in acquiring, constructing or substantially
improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer, and (2) is secured by such res-
idence. Since the enactment of the 1987 amendments referred to (see Pub. L. No.
100-203, § 10102(a), 101 Stat. 1330-384 (1987)), it also includes indebtedness se-
cured by such residence resulting from the refinancing of indebtedness meeting
the requirements of the preceding sentence, but only to the extent that the in-
debtedness resulting from the refinancing does not exceed the amount of the refi-
nanced indebtedness. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(1988)(flush language). The statute
also includes within this definition any indebtedness in a series of refinancings, to
the extent that (1) the initial indebtedness in the series was incurred in acquir-
ing, constructing or substantially improving any qualified residence of the tax-
payer and was secured by such a residence, and (2) the amount of the particular
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ferring to the statutory language, the majority emphasized that in a
refinancing transaction the funds are ordinarily used not to purchase
or improve a principal residence, but rather to repay the loan that is
already in existence and thereby lower the interest costs incurred or
achieve some other financial goal not connected directly with home
ownership. Finally, the majority was unwilling to reach a contrary
result merely because the taxpayers, at least in part by their own
choosing, had structured the transaction so that they would be liable
within three years for the repayment of the entire outstanding bal-
ance of the January 1981 loan.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, relying largely upon the
reasoning of Tax Court Judge Ruwe's dissenting opinion below. 37
Like Judge Ruwe, the Eighth Circuit panel believed that the Tax
Court majority had construed too narrowly the phrase "in connection
with" contained in section 461(g)(2). It concluded that the quoted
phrase required only that the indebtedness have an "'association' or
'relation' with the purchase of the taxpayer's residence," and empha-
sized that the statute did not by its terms impose the standard articu-
lated by the Tax Court majority (ie., that the indebtedness be
"directly related to the actual acquisition of the principal resi-
dence").3 8 The Tax Court considered the initial short-term loan to be
merely the first integrated step by which the taxpayers secured fi-
nancing to purchase their home, a process which was completed when
they incurred the permanent, thirty-year loan in September 1983.
Hence, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the latter indebtedness was
incurred in connection with the purchase or improvement of a princi-
pal residence, and that the points paid in connection therewith were
therefore deductible under section 461(g)(2). 3 9 The Eighth Circuit's
decision in Huntsman thus opened the door to a deduction for points
paid in connection with a refinancing of prior indebtedness that was
itself used to purchase or improve the taxpayers' principal residence.
The correctness of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Huntsman is
open to question. Granted, its reading of the statutory phrase "in con-
nection with" is linguistically defensible. Additionally, the pertinent
indebtedness does not exceed the amount of the indebtedness that it refinanced.
Id For a discussion of the differences between § 163(h) and § 461(g), see infra
text accompanying notes 49-55.
37. For a discussion of Huntsman, see Mark B. Persellin et al., Eighth Circuit's Deci-
sion in Huntsman Complicates Treatment of Points Incurred in Refinancings, 15
REv. TAX'N INDIVIuALs 302 (1991)(discussing Eighth Circuit's opinion). See also
J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, The Service Wins on Points: Interpreting
Section 461(g)(2), 13 REv. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 276 (1989)(discussing Tax Court's
decision in Huntsman).
38. Huntsman v. Comm'r, 905 F.2d 1182, 1184 (8th Cir. 1990)(quoting from 91 T.C 917,
921 (1988)).
39. r& at 1185.
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legislative history is not explicit on the applicability vel non of section
461(g)(2) to the facts presented in the case. Yet, the legislative history
does emphasize the specific and technical requirements of the statute,
and gives the overall impression that Congress intended section
461(g)(2) as a narrow, rather than expansive, exception to the broad
rule of disallowance under section 461(g)(1). 40 Furthermore, by hold-
ing that the taxpayers' initial three-year, balloon note financing could
be integrated with the later refinancing loan, the Eighth Circuit's
opinion leaves open the question of whether an initial loan can have a
longer term (e.g., five years or more), yet still be integrated with a
later refinancing, such that the latter indebtedness will be deemed "in
connection with" the purchase or improvement of the principal resi-
dence. This fact creates the possibility that further cases will arise,
with resolution of the issue occurring on a case-by-case basis.41
Although not determinative of the question, the pertinent legislative
history does indicate that by enacting section 461(g), Congress was
concerned that then-existing law was itself uncertain because it im-
posed a "case-by-case" approach as to whether particular prepayments
of interest resulted in a "material distortion of income." 42 It is plausi-
ble that Congress sought to create a more objective, bright-line test by
enacting section 461(g), a goal that is undermined by the more fact-
specific approach taken by the Eighth Circuit in Huntsman.
In view of its position that refinancing loans of the type involved in
Huntsman are not within section 461(g)(2), the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice will not follow that decision outside of the Eighth Circuit.43 As a
practical or planning matter, however, it is unlikely that many taxpay-
ers will purposely avail themselves of the type of short-term financing
and refinancing present in Huntsman. Unless interest rates are at an
historically high level (as was the case in 1981, when the taxpayers in
Huntsman incurred their initial loan), many borrowers will likely be
unwilling to bear the economic risk inherent in a balloon note financ-
ing. Moreover, the presence of significant non-deductible transaction
costs (e.g., title search and insurance fees, appraisals, counsel fees and
other closing costs) in such financings and refinancings would seem to
be a further deterrent to deliberately structuring a transaction in this
40. As noted supra text accompanying notes 16-17, the committee reports provide
that a loan will not qualify under the § 461(g)(2) exception "if the loan proceeds
are used for purposes other than purchasing or improving the taxpayer's princi-
pal residence, or if loan proceeds secured by property are used to purchase or
improve his residence. The exception applies only to points on a home mortgage,
and not to other interest costs on such a mortgage."
41. See infra note 44.
42. See supra text accompanying note 13.
43. Action on Decision CC-1991-02, Feb. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, Rels File.
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manner.4
It is, therefore, probable that courts will limit Huntsman to its
facts, as the Tax Court has recently done. For example, in Kelly v.
Commissioner,4 5 the taxpayer purchased a home in December 1983
with a thirty-year, variable rate mortgage loan which provided for in-
terest rate readjustments every three years. In June 1986, he refi-
nanced the initial loan with a fifteen-year, fixed rate mortgage, in
connection with which he paid and deducted $1250 in points. The Tax
Court sustained the Commissioner's disallowance of the deduction. It
emphasized that, unlike the initial three-year loan in Huntsman, the
refinanced loan at issue in Kelly was payable over thirty years and was
not required to be repaid within a short period of time. Thus, the tax-
payer was not required to obtain the later loan. Rather, he had ob-
tained it not to finalize the purchase of a principal residence, but
instead to secure a fixed and lower rate of interest. Similarly, in Dodd
v. Commissioner,46 the taxpayer paid points in connection with refi-
nancing a mortgage on property that he converted from his principal
residence to rental property. The Tax Court distinguished Huntsman
on the grounds that the refinanced loan at issue constituted long-term,
permanent financing rather than a short-term, temporary loan. It fur-
ther noted that section 461(g)(2) was in any event inapplicable because
the property secured by the refinancing loan had ceased to be the tax-
payer's principal residence.
3. Loan Proceeds Used in Connection with the "Improvement"
of a Principal Residence and the Related Problems of
Refinancing
The exception provided by section 461(g)(2) also applies to points
paid for indebtedness incurred in connection with the improvement of
44. In preparing this article, however, the author has learned that certain lenders
presently offer so-called "30 due in 5" or "30 due in 7" loans. These loans provide
for monthly payments at a fixed interest rate based upon a thirty-year amortiza-
tion schedule. However, after five or seven years, respectively, the unpaid princi-
pal balance of the loan becomes due. At that time, if certain conditions are met,
the lender will extend the loan at an interest rate determined by reference to a
certain FHLMC rate for an additional 25- or 23-year term upon the payment of a
fee and "related costs." However, the lender is not required to extend the term if
the prescribed certain conditions are not met. Similarly, the borrower is free to
decide not to extend the loan, and may choose to repay the amount due from the
proceeds of another loan. If, during the fifth or seventh years of such loans, as
applicable, a taxpayer pays points in either extending such a loan or incurring a
new loan with which to repay the outstanding principal amount of the initial
loan, there is an argument that those points are deductible under the rationale of
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Huntsman, since the extension or refinancing or
can be seen as having an "association or relation" with the initial loan.
45. 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1406 (1991).
46. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3141 (1992).
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a taxpayer's principal residence.47 Cases and rulings have not gener-
ally addressed this aspect of the use of proceeds under section
461(g)(2). The Internal Revenue Service has ruled, however, that
where points are paid in connection with a loan that is used partly to
refinance an existing purchase money mortgage and partly to improve
the taxpayer's principal residence, that portion of the points attributa-
ble to the portion of loan used for the improvement of the residence is
deductible under section 461(g)(2), even though the remainder of the
loan proceeds are used for a non-qualifying purpose.48
4. Disparity between Qualified Residence Interest Defined in
Section 163 and Points Qualifying for Deduction
under Section 461(g)(2)
Finally, with regard to the requirement concerning the purpose for
which loan proceeds are used, some disparity exists between the terms
used in section 461(g)(2) and the definition of deductible "qualified
residence interest" under section 163(h). As indicated above, "inter-
est" must be deductible generally under section 163 in order to be both
subject to section 461(g)(1) and eligible for the exception of section
461(g)(2).49 However, because of linguistic differences between the
two provisions, the timing of the deduction for prepaid interest or
points that constitute "qualified residence interest" under section 163
may still be affected under section 461(g).
First, "qualified residence interest" under section 163 consists of
"acquisition indebtedness" and "home equity indebtedness," either of
which can include indebtedness secured by a residence other than the
taxpayer's principal residence.50 Under section 461(g)(2), however,
points are currently deductible only if they relate to indebtedness se-
cured by and incurred in connection with the purchase or improve-
ment of the taxpayer's principal residence. Thus, for example,
47. Here again, the statutory language expressly requires that such indebtedness be
secured by the taxpayer's principal residence in order for § 461(g)(2) to apply.
48. In Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146 (Situation 2) the taxpayer initially obtained a
loan exclusively for the purchase of a principal residence. In 1986, she obtained a
new $100,000 loan secured by the residence, using $80,000 of the proceeds to retire
the outstanding principal balance of the old mortgage loan, and using the remain-
ing proceeds to pay for improvements on her principal residence that cost $20,000.
In obtaining the refinancing loan, she paid 3.6 points ($3600). The Internal Reve-
nue Service ruled that 80 percent of the new loan (that portion of the proceeds
used to repay the old mortgage) was not incurred in connection with the purchase
or improvement of the taxpayer's principal residence and, therefore, points allo-
cable thereto were not deductible under § 461(g)(2). However, the remaining 20
percent of the indebtedness was incurred in connection with the improvement of
the principal residence. Therefore, 20 percent of the total points paid (20% of
$3600, or $720) were deductible under § 461(g)(2).
49. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 2.
1110 [Vol. 71:1095
I.R.C. SECTION 461(g)
although interest on indebtedness incurred to purchase or substan-
tially improve a second residence (other than the taxpayer's principal
residence) is deductible under section 163(h), points paid in connection
with such indebtedness are not deductible under section 461(g)(2).
Second, as noted earlier, the definition of "acquisition indebted-
ness" expressly includes certain indebtedness used to refinance ex-
isting indebtedness,51 whereas authorities construing section 461(g)(2)
have generally held that points paid in connection with debt incurred
to refinance existing debt are not eligible for deduction under section
461(g)(2). 5 2
Finally, the definition of "acquisition indebtedness" under section
163(h) requires that the loan proceeds be used to "acquire, construct,
or substantially improve a qualified residence of the taxpayer,"
whereas section 461(g)(2) requires that the indebtedness be used in
connection with the "purchase or improvement of ... the principal
residence of the taxpayer." This linguistic difference raises two sepa-
rate issues. First, it is unclear that section 461(g)(2) is phrased broadly
enough to permit a current deduction for points paid in respect of in-
debtedness incurred to construct (as distinguished from purchase) a
principal residence. Second, if the indebtedness is incurred to substan-
tially improve, and is secured by, the taxpayer's principal residence,
points paid in connection therewith will satisfy the requirements for
current deductibility under sections 163(h)(3)(B) and 461(g)(2).5 3 But,
what if the loan proceeds are used to improve, and are secured by, the
taxpayer's principal residence, but the particular improvements are
not considered "substantial?" Although such debt is not "acquisition
indebtedness" under section 163(h)(3), it may qualify as "home equity
indebtedness,"M subject to the limits set forth in section 163(h)(3)(C).
Accordingly, points paid where the loan is used to improve and is se-
cured by the taxpayer's principal residence, but the improvement is
not considered "substantial," should nevertheless be eligible for de-
duction under section 163(h)(3)(C)(as home equity indebtedness) and
under section 461(g)(2).55
In light of the foregoing discussion, it appears that the disparity
51. See supra note 36.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 33-45.
53. Cf. Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146, discussed supra note 47, (indicating that
where 20% of loan proceeds were used to improve a principal residence, 20% of
points paid in obtaining the loan were deductible under I.R.C. § 461(g)(2)).
54. See supra note 4.
55. Cf. Persellin, et al., supra note 37 (suggesting that where indebtedness of over $1
million is incurred in connection with the purchase of a principal residence,
points paid in connection therewith are deductible to the extent that they are
allocable either to acquisition indebtedness (i.e., the first $1 million of indebted-
ness) or to home equity indebtedness (ie., the remaining indebtedness, up to a
maximum amount of $100,000)).
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between section 163(h) and section 461(g)(2) is both a source of com-
plexity and a potential obstacle to taxpayer compliance in this area.
Accordingly, given the current law's relatively limited definition of
deductible interest under section 163, it seems appropriate for Con-
gress to consider whether, in the interest of administrability, section
461(g)(2) should be amended to make the category of points deductible
thereunder more consistent with the category of interest deductible
under section 163(h). If Congress wishes to clarify without substan-
tially altering the law in this area, it could import into section
461(g)(2) the basic idea contained in the definition of "acquisition in-
debtedness" under section 163(h), insofar as it relates to a taxpayer's
principal residence. This could be accomplished by amending section
461(g)(2) to provide, in substance, as follows:
(2) EXCEPTION - This subsection shall not apply to points paid in re-
spect of any principal residence acquisition indebtedness, to the extent that,
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such payment of points is an
established business practice in the area in which such indebtedness is in-
curred, and the amount of such payment does not exceed the amount gener-
ally charged in such area. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "principal
residence acquisition indebtedness" means any indebtedness which is (a) in-
curred in [or alternatively, in connection with] acquiring, constructing, or sub-
stantially improving a principal residence (within the meaning of section 1034)
of the taxpayer and (b) secured by such residence."
Such a revision would not, absent specific references in pertinent
legislative history, necessarily resolve the issues raised by the Hunts-
man decision concerning points paid in the context of refinancings.
However, it would at least harmonize the language of sections 163(h)
and 461(g)(2) and make each provision more consistent with the other.
It would also have the further effect of clarifying the immediate de-
ductibility of points paid in connection with indebtedness incurred to
construct a principal residence.
D. Timing of Allowance of Deduction for Points not Within Section
461(g)(2)
When an otherwise proper deduction for points is not currently al-
lowable under section 461(g)(2), because, for example, the points were
withheld from the loan proceeds advanced by the lender or the loan
proceeds were not used for a qualifying purpose specified in section
461(g)(2), a question arises as to when the taxpayer may claim the de-
duction. Under the law in effect prior to the enactment of section
461(g), such points were treated as having been paid ratably over the
life of the loan.6 That also appears to have been the prevailing prac-
56. Thus, for example, in Cathcart v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321 (1977), the tax-
payers were required to prorate the sum of $1080.60 in points over the entire 29
year period of their loan. They incurred the loan in January 1973 and made 11
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tice after the enactment of section 461(g).5 7 It is significant, however,
that by its terms, the statute provides that "interest paid by the [cash-
method] taxpayer that is properly allocable to any period (A) with re-
spect to which the interest represents a charge for the use or forbear-
ance of money and (B) which is after the close of the taxable year in
which paid shall be charged to capital account and shall be treated as
paid in the period to which so allocable."5 8 Thus, a taxpayer who is
subject to section 461(g)(1) may not deduct interest paid earlier than
the taxable year in which (and to the extent that) the interest repre-
sents a charge for the use or forbearance of money. The question of
identifying the "proper taxable year with respect to which the interest
represents a charge for the use or forbearance of money" has been
made somewhat more difficult by the tax law's recent emphasis, par-
ticularly since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, on time
value of money issues and the principles of economic accrual.59
This recent emphasis suggests that a ratable allocation of points
deferred under section 461(g) might not be permissible because, put
simply, that method (ie., dividing the total amount of interest to be
paid over the total period of the loan) does not conform to the princi-
ples of economic accrual. However, requiring individuals to use princi-
ples of economic accrual could impose upon them a significant degree
of complexity that could be avoided by permitting the use of a simple
method of ratable accrual. Accordingly, in Revenue Procedure 87-
monthly payments in that year. The court determined that their ratable share of
the deduction for 1973 was $34.34 by using the following formula:
Points paid ($1,086.60) x (# of monthly payments made during year (11)/12
months) x (1/29-year term).
57. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-37-058 (June 12, 1986) wherein the taxpayer paid seven
points during 1983 in connection with a 29-year loan for the purchase of a home.
Because only three points represented the normal and customary charge in the
area, four of the seven points, although actually paid, were ineligible for the
§ 461(g)(2) exception and therefore subject to the deferral rule of § 461(g). The
taxpayer had deducted 1/29th of the amount of these four points ratably on her
1984 and 1985 returns. During 1986, when approximately $3000 of the points re-
mained to be deducted, the taxpayer refinanced the 1983 mortgage. The Internal
Revenue Service approved the taxpayer's treatment of the points for 1984 and
1985, indicating that prepaid interest (other than that eligible for the exception
under § 461(g)) "is deducted ratably over the life of the loan." Furthermore, it
ruled that because the taxpayer repaid the balance of the original 29-year loan in
1986 using the proceeds of the refinancing loan, the $3000 of prepaid interest re-
maining to be deducted under the original loan should be deducted on her 1986
income tax return.
58. I.R.C. § 461(g)(1)(1988).
59. See Lawrence Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAx L. REv. 1 (1986-
1987); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of
Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986). Cf. Prabel v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 1101 (1988)(de-
duction of interest computed by using the "Rule of 78s" did not comport with
principles of economic accrual and was disallowed).
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15,60 the Internal Revenue Service indicated that, as a matter of ad-
ministrative convenience, certain taxpayers would be permitted con-
sistently to allocate points ratably over the indebtedness period,
rather than be required to use principles of economic accrual. That
revenue procedure permits cash-method taxpayers who satisfy speci-
fied requirements to use a ratable allocation method where the cur-
rent deduction of points is disallowed either because the exception
provided by section 461(g)(2) is unavailable or because the points were
withheld by the lender as part of a net proceeds loan. For the sake of
administrative convenience, therefore, the Internal Revenue Service
has expressly allowed eligible taxpayers to use a ratable allocation
method, notwithstanding that method's divergence from the princi-
ples of economic accrual61
IV. REVENUE PROCEDURE 92-12: A SAFE HARBOR FOR
DEDUCTING POINTS PAID IN CONNECTION WITH
THE ACQUISITION OF A PRINCIPAL
RESIDENCE
A. Overview and Requirements of the Safe Harbor
In light of the foregoing, it is appropriate to consider the Internal
Revenue Service's most recent pronouncement in this area, Revenue
Procedure 92-12. The stated purpose of Revenue Procedure 92-12 is to
"minimize possible disputes regarding the deductibility of points paid
60. Rev. Proc. 87-15, 1987-1 C.B. 624.
61. The ratable allocation method endorsed in Rev. Proc. 87-15 applies to a taxpayer
who:
(1) Is an individual;
(2) Uses the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting;,
(3) Was charged points in respect of an indebtedness such that:
(A) The indebtedness is secured by a residence (whether or not the resi-
dence of the taxpayer);
(B) The term of the indebtedness is no greater than 30 years;
(C) If the term of the indebtedness is greater than 10 years, the provisions
of the indebtedness, including the requirements concerning when principal
must be repaid, are customary (in the area where the indebtedness was
incurred) for loans of the same or longer term financing the purchase of
residential real estate; and
(D) Either-
(i) The initial principal amount of the indebtedness was no greater
than $250,000; or
(ii) The number of points charged was no greater than-
(a) 4, in the case of indebtedness with a term of 15 years of less;
(b) 6, in the case of indebtedness with a term of over 15 years; and
(4) May deduct the points no sooner than the taxable year to which they
are allocable.
Rev. Proc. 87-15, 1987-1, C.B. 624. For a discussion of how, under the princi-
ples of economic accrual, points might be treated as accruing like original issue
discount under a self-amortizing installment loan, see Lokken, supra note 59 at
24, n.42 and 64-66.
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in connection with the acquisition of a principal residence." 62 To that
end, it creates a safe harbor test which, if satisfied, will ensure that
amounts are treated as currently deductible points. Specifically, the
Internal Revenue Service will consider amounts paid by a cash
method taxpayer to be deductible "points" where all five of the follow-
ing criteria are satisfied:
- Designation on Uniform Settlement Statement. The amount must
be designated as "points incurred" in connection with the indebted-
ness on the Uniform Settlement Statement (i.e., the Form HUD-1)
prescribed under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974.63
- Computation as, Percentage of Amount Borrowed. The amount
must be computed as a percentage of the stated principal amount of
the indebtedness incurred by the taxpayer.
- Charged Under Established Business Practice. The amount paid
must conform to an established business practice of charging points
for loans for the acquisition of personal residences in the area in which
the residence is located, and the amount of points paid must not ex-
ceed the amount generally charged in that area.
- Paid for Acquisition of Principal Residence. The amount must be
paid in connection with the acquisition of the taxpayer's principal resi-
dence, and the loan must be secured by that residence.
- Paid Directly By Taxpayer. The amount must be paid directly by
the taxpayer. An amount is so paid if the taxpayer provides, from
funds that have not been borrowed for this purpose as part of the over-
all transaction, an amount at least equal to the amount required to be
applied as points at the closing. The amount provided may include
down payments, escrow deposits, earnest money applied at the closing,
and other funds actually paid over at closing.
B. Discussion of the Criteria
The first two requirements of the safe harbor are apparently
designed to ensure that the amount deducted as points actually consti-
tutes interest, that is, compensation for the use or forbearance of
money. The first requirement, that the amount be designated as
points on the Form HUD-1, makes it likely that the lender and the
borrower both will treat the points consistently for Federal income
tax purposes. 64 No particular language is required in designating the
62. Rev. Proc. 92-12, 1992-3 I.R.B. 27. Rev. Proc. 92-12 was clarified and amended in
several respects by Rev. Proc. 92-12A, 1992-26 I.R.B. 20 (June 29, 1992). For a
description of the provisions of Rev. Proc. 92-12A, see infra notes 65, 69, and 75.
63. Id at § 2.01; The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2617 (1988).
64. In cases in which points are immediately deductible by the borrower under
§ 461(g)(2), the mortgage lender has gross income upon receipt of the points,
whether the lender uses the cash receipts and disbursements method or accrual
method of accounting. See, e.g., Bell Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Comm'r, 62
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points as such on the Form HUD-1. Rather, the revenue procedure
contemplates that the amount can be designated as "loan origination
fees" (including amounts so designated on Veterans Affairs (VA) and
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans), "loan discount," "dis-
count points" or "points."65 The second requirement, that the amount
designated as points be computed as a percentage of the loan amount,
is designed to ensure that the amount of points will be a function of
the amount loaned, and therefore constitute interest for tax purposes
(that is, a charge for the use or forbearance of money, rather than a
charge for services).
The third requirement, that the amounts paid conform to an estab-
lished business practice in the area and do not exceed amounts gener-
ally charged in the area, is derived from the statute itself. There is
little prior authority concerning this requirement,6 6 and resolution of
the issue in any given case apparently depends upon lending practices
within the particular geographic region in which the loan transaction
occurs. The safe harbor of the revenue procedure uses as the relevant
geographic area "the area in which the residence is located," whereas
the statute refers to "the area in which the indebtedness is incurred."
One anticipates that in many cases these two geographic areas will
correspond with one another. Situations could arise, however, in
which they do not. In those cases, in order to be within the safe har-
bor, it must be ascertained that the charging of points is consistent
with the business practice in the locality in which the residence is lo-
cated, and that the amount of points so charged does not exceed the
usual and customary amount in that area. Finally, consistent with its
aims under the first two requirements, Revenue Procedure 92-12 em-
phasizes in connection with this third requirement that "if amounts
designated as points are paid in lieu of amounts that are originally
T.C.M. (CCH) 376 (1991)(accrual method taxpayer); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-31-007
(Apr. 18, 1986)(cash method taxpayer). See generally, Lokken, supra note 59 at
24, n.42.
65. Rev. Proc. 92-12, § 1992-3, I.R.B. 27. The reference to loan origination fees on VA
and FHA loans was added by Rev. Proc. 92-12A, 1993-26 I.R.B. 20. That latter
revenue procedure further added a new section to Rev. Proc. 92-12 to clarify that
the safe harbor applies to VA and FA loan origination fees that meet the re-
quirements of that revenue procedure.
66. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-37-058 (June 12, 1986), the taxpayer purchased a home and
paid in the aggregate seven points, whereas payment of only three points was the
normal and customary practice in the area. The taxpayer in the ruling had imme-
diately deducted three points and prorated the remaining four points based upon
the 29-year life of the loan (ie., 1/29 per year) through 1986, at which time she
refinanced the initial mortgage. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that in 1986,
when she refinanced and repaid the initial loan, the taxpayer could deduct that
the portion of the four points that remained to be deducted (ie., 26/29). The
ruling assumed as a fact that the four points in question were in excess of the
normal and customary charges in the area, and thus did not set forth criteria that
would be used for making such a determination. See supra note 57.
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stated separately on the settlement statement (such as appraisal fees,
inspection fees, title fees, attorney fees, property taxes, and mortgage
insurance premiums), those amounts are not deductible as points
under [the] revenue procedure."
As discussed above, the determination of whether any given tax-
payer satisfies the third requirement of the safe harbor test is depen-
dent upon the lending practices in the geographic region in which the
residence is located. This fact undermines somewhat the objective
guidelines that a safe harbor test is generally intended to provide,
since taxpayers will apparently have to independently determine what
such practices are. The Internal Revenue Service has not attempted
to prescribe set numerical safe harbors within various geographic re-
gions. On this point, the statutory language of section 461(g)(2) pro-
vides that section 461(g)(1) will not apply to qualifying points "to the
extent that, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such pay-
ment of points is an established business practice in the area in which
such indebtedness is incurred, and the amount of such payment does
not exceed the amount generally charged in such area."6 7 The statute
thus seems to have contemplated that regulations would indicate
whether and to what extent the payment of points was consistent with
prevailing lending practices on an area-by-area basis, but no such regu-
lations have been proposed or issued. Providing such guidance on an
area-by-area basis, either through regulations or other, less formal
guidance, would facilitate the determination of whether the payment
of points by any given taxpayer complies with the third requirement
of the safe harbor of Revenue Procedure 92-12.68
The fourth requirement indicates that the safe harbor of the reve-
nue procedure applies only to amounts paid in connection with the
acquisition of the taxpayer's principal residence and emphasizes that
the loan must be secured by that residence. This is not to say that
points not meeting these criteria will not be deductible under section
461(g)(2); they may or may not be, depending upon the facts. How-
ever, they will not be within the safe harbor of the revenue proce-
dure.69 Thus, taxpayers seeking to deduct points not within the safe
67. LR.C. § 461(g)(2)(1988)(emphasis added).
68. Compare in this respect, Rev. Proc. 87-15, discussed supra note 61, providing
guidelines as to when taxpayers who pay points that are not currently deductible
under § 461(g)(2) may use a proration method to deduct the points over the life of
the loan, rather than a method that reflects the economic accrual of interest.
There, the Service provides guidelines based upon the number of points paid, the
maturity of the loan, the amount financed and various other factors. An analo-
gous approach under § 461(g)(2) outlining numerical safe harbors on a region-by-
region basis would be of assistance to taxpayers in determining compliance with
this third test of Rev. Proc. 92-12.
69. As amended by Rev. Proc. 92-12A, discussed supra note 61, Rev. Proc. 92-12 indi-
cates five categories of points to which the safe harbor of the revenue procedure
does not apply:
19921 1117
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1095
harbor will have to rely upon other authorities, as discussed herein.
Finally, the fifth requirement reiterates that, as illustrated by the
authorities discussed earlier, the taxpayer must actually and directly
pay the points in question in order to deduct them under section
461(g)(2).70 On this point, it is significant that the revenue procedure
indicates that this requirement will be met "if the taxpayer provides,
from funds that have not been borrowed for this purpose as part of the
overall transaction, an amount at least equal to the amount required
to be applied as points at the closing."
The revenue procedure's inclusion of the foregoing language is po-
tentially problematic, since it suggests that the safe harbor is unavaila-
ble if a taxpayer pays points by using borrowed funds, even though
those funds are borrowed from someone who is not the mortgage
1. Points paid in connection with the acquisition of a principal residence, to the
extent that the points are allocable to an amount of principal in excess of the
aggregate amount that may be treated as acquisition indebtedness under
§ 163(h)(3)(B)(ii)(1988);
2. Points paid for loans the proceeds of which are to be used for the improve-
ment, as opposed to the acquisition, of a principal residence;
3. Points paid for loans to purchase or improve a residence that is not the tax-
payer's principal residence, such as a second home, vacation property, investment
property, or trade or business property; and
4. Points paid on a refinancing loan, home equity loan, or line of credit, even
though the indebtedness is secured by a principal residence.
5. Points paid by the seller of a principal residence to or on behalf of the buyer
as part of the overall transaction.
The Service has apparently chosen to exclude these five categories of points
from the operation of the safe harbor for a variety of reasons. As this article
suggests, the deductibility of points described in the first category would seem
dependent upon the specific facts. Although such points will not be considered
interest on "acquisition indebtedness," they may, in appropriate cases, be treated
as interest on "home equity indebtedness." See supra note 55. Points described
in the second category are, subject to the qualifications described supra text ac-
companying notes 53-55, generally deductible under § 461(g)(2), although the In-
ternal Revenue Service has not chosen to include them within the safe harbor.
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. Points described in the third cate-
gory are clearly ineligible for the § 461(g)(2) exception. The deductibility of
points described in the fourth category is particularly dependent upon the use to
which the loan proceeds are put and, thus, not generally susceptible of a safe
harbor test. Cf. Rev. Rul. 87-22, discussed supra note 53 (holding 20% of points
deductible under § 461(g)(2) where 20% of loan proceeds are used for improve-
ment of principal residence). Furthermore, the Service has generally taken the
position that points paid in connection with indebtedness that is incurred to refi-
nance other indebtedness is not eligible for deduction under § 461(g)(2). See
supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text. Finally, the Service has apparently
chosen to exclude points in the fifth category, added by Rev. Proc. 92-12A, in
order to enforce the requirement of the safe harbor, discussed infra text accom-
panying note 70, that the taxpayer directly pay the amounts to be treated as
points. For further discussion of this fifth category of exclusion from the safe
harbor, see infra note 75.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31. See also infra note 75.
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lender (from a parent, for example). The cases and authorities dis-
cussed herein indicate that the Internal Revenue Service's principal
concern in this context is the situation in which the points are with-
held by the lender as part of a net proceeds loan.71 Furthermore, re-
garding the deductibility of interest generally, the Internal Revenue
Service has taken the view that a cash method taxpayer will not be
considered to have "paid" interest on an outstanding loan where pay-
ment is made with funds themselves borrowed for that purpose from
the same lender to whom the interest payment is owed.72 However,
where such an arrangement is not present, and actual payment is
made, a deduction should be allowable even if the payment was made
out of funds that were themselves borrowed, so long as the mortgage
lender was not the source of those funds.73 On this subject, it should
be noted that the revenue procedure does not provide categorically
that the funds used to pay points may not be "borrowed," but rather
that they "may not be borrowed for this purpose as part of the overall
transaction." This language might be interpreted to mean that the
safe harbor is available so long as the funds were not borrowed as part
of the overall transaction or course of dealing between the taxpayer
71. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
72. For a cash method taxpayer, the giving of the taxpayer's own promissory note
does not constitute payment, although the remittance of money borrowed from a
third party does. See Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm'r, 429 U.S. 569 (1977). Apply-
ing this rationale, there is some question in the cases as to whether a cash method
borrower will be considered to have "paid" interest on an outstanding loan where
payment is made with funds themselves borrowed from the same lender. Com-
pare Burck v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 556 (1975), aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 768 (2d
Cir. 1976)(allowing a deduction so long as borrower had "unrestricted use of the
funds," as where they are placed in and commingled with an account not main-
tained with the original lender) with Battelstein v. Internal Revenue Service, 631
F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc), cert denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981) and Wilkerson
v. Comm'r, 655 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1981)(applying a "purpose" test, and disallowing
a deduction where a cash method taxpayer borrows money from a lender for the
express purpose of satisfying an interest obligation owed to that same lender).
The Internal Revenue Service has indicated that it will follow the approach of the
Battelstein and Wilkerson decisions. See Announcement 83-138 (Aug. 8, 1983)
contained in 1983-32 I.R.B. 30.
73. Although, as noted supra note 72, some courts have held that a deduction is not
allowed where interest on one loan is paid with funds borrowed from the same
lender, the cases nevertheless agree that a deduction is proper where the interest
is paid with the proceeds of a separate loan from a third party. See e.g., Battel-
stein v. Internal Revenue Service, 631 F.2d 1182,1185, n.3 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981)(acknowledging "the well-established rule that
where a taxpayer borrows money from a third party to pay interest due his origi-
nal lender, the interest is considered paid and deductible") and Wilkerson v.
Comm'r, 655 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1981)(similarly distinguishing case before it
from "those situations in which a separate loan from a third party is used to pay
interest"), each citing McAdams v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 231 (1950), aff'd, 198 F.2d 54
(5th Cir. 1952) and Crain v. Comm'r, 75 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1935).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1095
and mortgage lender.74 Accordingly, it is to be hoped that the safe
harbor of the revenue procedure will be available so long as the points
are paid out of funds that are not borrowed from the mortgage lender.
In any case, cautious taxpayers will probably wish to pay points out of
funds not borrowed from any source, in order to ensure that they
squarely comply with this aspect of the safe harbor.75
74. A further argument in favor of so construing this aspect of Rev. Proc. 92-12 is
found in Rev. Proc. 92-11 1992-3 I.R.B. 26 (Jan. 20,1992), issued concurrently with
Rev. Proc. 92-12. Rev. Proc. 92-11 deals with information reporting requirements
imposed by I.R.C. § 6050H upon recipients of points paid in connection with the
financing of a purchase of a principal residence and creates a safe harbor for the
information reporting of such points. Specifically, it provides that an interest re-
cipient may report as points under I.R.C. § 6050H(b)(2)(C) any amount that satis-
fies each of the safe harbor requirements of Rev. Proc. 92-12, including the
requirement that the points be "paid directly by the borrower." Rev. Proc. 92-11
indicates that, at least for purposes of this information reporting safe harbor, this
latter requirement "will be treated as satisfied if the amount to be treated as paid
directly by the borrower was not loaned for this purpose by an interest recipient
as part of the overall transaction." [Emphasis added]. Thus, although it only pur-
ports to address the information reporting safe harbor created by Rev. Proc. 92-
11, this language strongly suggests that the requirement in Rev. Proc. 92-12 that
the points be paid directly by the borrower should be treated as satisfied where
the funds used for such payment were not borrowed from the mortgage lender
itself.
Rev. Proc. 92-11 further provides that a lender of record may enter into a
designation agreement with another person, such as a mortgage broker, which
transfers to the designee the responsibility for making the information return
required by I.R.C. § 6050H concerning points. In order for the designee to rely
upon the information reporting safe harbor of Rev. Proc. 92-11, however, the
"designation agreement must contain the designator's [ie., lender's] representa-
tion that it did not lend the amount to be treated as paid directly by the borrower
for this purpose as part of the overall transaction." Again, this language supports
the argument that a borrower will be treated as having paid the points directly
where the funds used to do so were not borrowed from the mortgage lender itself.
75. As indicated supra note 69, Rev. Proc. 92-12A specifies that the safe harbor of
Rev. Proc. 92-12 will also not apply to any "[p]oints paid by the seller of a princi-
pal residence on behalf of the buyer as part of the overall transaction." This ex-
clusion is apparently intended to ensure compliance with the requirement under
the safe harbor that points be paid directly by the taxpayer. Thus, cautious tax-
payers will also want to arrange to pay points directly to the lender, rather than
enter into an arrangement under which the seller of property agrees to pay all or
part of the points.
Absent a special rule, rigid application of the foregoing limitation could make
the protections of the safe harbor wholly or partly unavailable whenever, as is
not uncommon, a seller pays some portion of the buyer's closing costs. For exam-
ple, assume that a buyer of a principal residence will be required to pay closing
costs of $4000, of which $1000 consists of points, and the seller agrees to pay $800
of the buyer's closing costs, with the buyer paying the remaining $3200. One pos-
sible approach would be to allocate any costs paid by the seller first to points to
the extent thereof, then to any remaining costs. Under such an approach, since
the seller paid only $800 and points constituted $1000, the full $800 paid by the
seller would be allocable to points, and thus render that amount of the total
points paid (ie., $800 of $1000) ineligible for deduction under the safe harbor of
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V. CONCLUSION
Although Congress has permitted individual taxpayers to deduct
"qualified residence interest," it has also continued to limit their abil-
ity to deduct prepaid interest, or "points" under section 461(g). As in-
dicated herein, points withheld by a lender as part of a net-proceeds
loan remain non-deductible by a cash method taxpayer and must be
deducted over the term of the loan. With the narrow exception of the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Huntsman, points paid in connection with
refinancings are not currently deductible, except to the extent that a
portion of the refinancing loan proceeds are used for the improvement
of a principal residence. Similarly, points that satisfy the definition of
"qualified residence interest" under section 163 are not, as such, auto-
matically deductible under section 461(g)(2). Points paid in connec-
tion with the purchase or acquisition of a second residence provide an
example of such a situation. As this Article has suggested, greater co-
ordination between sections 163(h) and 461(g) would alleviate some of
the confusion in this area.
The Internal Revenue Service is to be commended for its recent
delineation in Revenue Procedure 92-12 of an administrative safe har-
bor for the deduction of points paid in connection with the purchase of
a principal residence. The revenue procedure conveniently states, in a
single pronouncement, the Internal Revenue Service's position con-
cerning this issue. Moreover, that position is largely consistent with
prior authorities discussed herein. Nevertheless, application of the re-
quirements of the revenue procedure may, in at least two respects,
require a more fact-specific inquiry than first appears, thus underinn-
ing somewhat the certainty that a safe harbor test is generally in-
tended to provide.
First, the revenue procedure seeks to implement section 461(g)(2),
by requiring that the charging of points conform to an established
business practice for loans for the acquisition of personal residences in
Rev. Proc. 92-12. Alternatively, a pro-rata approach could be applied; under such
an approach, since 1000/4000 or 1/4 of the total closing costs consisted of points, 1/
4 of the $800, or $600 paid by the seller would be treated as a payment of points,
hence making that portion of the points paid ($600 of the full $1000) ineligible for
the safe harbor. Significantly, however, the rule actually decided upon by the
Service seems to maximize the likelihood that the safe harbor will be available.
Specifically, as amended by Rev. Proc. 92-12A, Rev. Proc. 92-12 provides that if
the seller pays any amount to or on behalf of the buyer, and the buyer and seller
do not explicitly allocate the amount to points, the amount is allocated, to the
extent possible, to expenditures other than points. Thus, on the facts described
above, where closing costs other than points exceeded $800, no part of the $800
paid by the seller would be allocated to points absent an explicit agreement to
that effect by the buyer and the seller. Therefore, the full $1000 of points will be
treated as having been paid by the buyer and thus be eligible for deduction under
the safe harbor.
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the area in which the residence is located, and that the amount of
points paid not exceed the amount generally charged in that area in
comparable transactions. By its nature, this inquiry is fact-specific and
requires a determination of the prevailing lending practices within a
particular geographic region. The Service or the Treasury should
consider providing more objective criteria concerning this aspect of
the safe harbor test, either through regulations or less formal
pronouncements.
Second, the revenue procedure contains a further degree of ambi-
guity and uncertainty that is inconsistent with the notion of a "safe
harbor" by providing that the points be paid "from funds not borrowed
for this purpose as part of the overall transaction" may add a further
degree of ambiguity and uncertainty that is inconsistent with the no-
tion of a "safe harbor." While this language may be intended to reflect
the case law holdings concerning the nondeductibility of points with-
held by a lender as part of a net proceeds loan, or the Internal Reve-
nue Service's position that a cash method taxpayer has not "paid"
interest where the funds are borrowed from the same lender for this
purpose, it arguably is more restrictive than the case law. It could pre-
clude a taxpayer from relying upon the safe harbor if points are paid
with funds borrowed from any source, even from a person other than
the mortgage lender. It further raises the question of what construc-
tion should be given to the phrase "part of the overall transaction."
This Article has argued in favor of a limited construction of that
phrase.
Finally, it should be recalled that Revenue Procedure 92-12 does
not purport to define a comprehensive, all-encompassing test. It ad-
dresses only the deductibility of points paid in connection with the ac-
quisition of a principal residence. Points not paid in that connection
may or may not be deductible under section 461(g)(2). This Article
has also described the Federal income tax treatment of points that are
not within the safe harbor.
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